In response to these observations I will use this paper to examine two questions: 1) What is the relation between design and the concept of the social? and 2) What are the possible political implications of design for social innovation? The fi rst question will be addressed through a selective survey of theoretical positions relevant to the social role of design. This will lead into a more focused examination of the results of the EMUDE (Emerging user demands) project, one of the most valuable research projects on design for social innovation published so far, in order to develop a provisional critique of the political function of design for social innovation vis à vis its ability to instigate discontinuous social change in the interest of sustainability.
Revisiting the Social Signifi cance of Design
What relation does design(ing) have to the concept of the social? Precedents for thinking about artefactual production, mediation, and consumption in social terms are numerous, rich and complex, and would be diffi cult to adequately survey in a single paper. 3 The more modest objective here is to derive some conclusions to this question by comparing a selection of recent work in social theory and philosophy.
A valuable starting point for returning to the question of design and the social is Clive Dilnot ' s Design as a socially signifi cant activity 4 which argued for design to be recognised as a distinct form of activity with signifi cance beyond the simple production of material things. According to Dilnot, design can be distinguished as a particular way of thinking and communicating that is concerned with giving form to the materiality of a human world. Dilnot stresses that the concept of form not only refers to the design of particular commodifi ed objects but should also be understood in terms of the ordering of an entire socio-technical mode of being. He adds that this conscious ordering of the material world towards human ends is an essential part of our praxiological being. 5 The consequence of this claim is that we are only what we are as a certain kind of being by means of what and how we give form to, organise, and draw signifi cance from the things that constitute our everyday environment. This point signals that design is never simply a means to a productive end but is in fact a much more complex activity with fundamental implications for human ontology. 6 Because designing involves synthesising the many complex and heterogeneous characteristics of a situation into a concrete form, design can also be seen as the activity that makes it possible for form to express or embody the character of a particular relation between people and things and the very means by which things are able to have an effect within such a relation. 7 Dilnot ' s account therefore provides grounding for the claim that design must be considered in social terms, and conversely that any discussion of sociality ought to take into account the effect of design.
While Dilnot was centrally concerned with design activity, his point concerning design ' s social relevance can also be connected to developments in the fi elds of social theory and philosophy. For instance, in his overview of the fi eld of social theory Andreas Reckwitz proposed that modern social theory has produced three distinctive ways of explaining human action and social order: the utilitarian homo economicus, the norm-orientated homo sociologicus, and the 20th century ' cultural theories ' . The limitation of this position has been highlighted by Erik Swyngedouw. Using Antonio Gramsci ' s theory of state/market/civil society interdependency Swyngedouw frames social innovation in more antagonistic terms:
The socially innovative fi gures of horizontally organised stakeholder arrangements of governance that appear to empower civil society in the face of an apparently overcrowded and ' excessive ' state, may, in the end, prove to be the Trojan Horse that diffuses and consolidates the ' market ' as the principle institutional form. 19 As Swyngedouw acknowledges, this concept of the misrecognised power-political function of civil society was also a key theme in Michel Foucault ' s studies on biopolitics. For instance, in his lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault lays out his history of the development of twentieth century liberalism, including its effect on social ordering and the peculiar role of civil society within this order. 20 In his description of liberalism Foucault includes attitudes, practices, methods and procedures of measuring and enforcing the proper intervention of governmental action. To this we might add the engineering, technologies, networks and devices that extended the liberal form of indirect social control. 21 Foucault emphasises that the principle of social regulation pursued within liberal doctrine was not concerned with facilitating the exchange of commodities as such but rather protecting and enhancing competitive enterprise as a mechanism for development. 22 Within liberalism, the provision of welfare in the form of social benefi ts is a perfectly reasonable practice on the strict condition that it does not equate to a form of collective, redistributive or socialist consumption, and that it addresses the symptoms of absolute poverty only and not any cause that coincides with the ideal conditions for competition. 23 Furthermore, according to Foucault the formation of civil society under liberalism is conditioned by its usefulness as a technique for resolving tensions between the economical and juridical roles of government, as well as a space to engage in shaping daily practices such as health and education. 24 The mechanisms of control that Foucault observed within liberalism were closely related to his concept of power. Foucault argued that it is a mistake to limit the concept of power to the question of sovereignty, restriction or oppression. Rather he claimed that power is diffuse, material, and productive, and consequently may just as easily be experienced as a form of choice, truth, need, or wealth. 25 Control within a liberal political order therefore can be seen to operate through stimulating experiences as much as in any authoritarian form of repression. This description has parallels with Slavoj Ž i ž ek ' s ideological explication of the injunction ' enjoy! ' -free consumption without an externally enforced prohibition not only authorises solicitation into unsustainable consumption but may also produce a more fastidious and politically debilitating form of self-regulation. 26 This suggests that power antagonisms and techniques of subliminal (ideological) and explicit (police, welfare, social services) control are always constitutive elements within any social relation. As such, the reluctance of social design literature to acknowledge these factors, or, as is the case in EMUDE, to limit discussion to a question of technique -as the effi ciency and effectiveness of governance -elides the question of how power itself is materially and symbolically organised and what kind of effects and forms it produces.
An Introduction into the Politics of Design for Social Innovation
An issue that follows from the elision of power in EMUDE is the possibility of imagining a form of action that may be critical for instigating discontinuous change (change that displaces an established structural order for something new), namely, the possibility of political action. As was the case with sociality, politics is yet another complex concept that demands more sophisticated treatment than can be given here. For our purposes though it will be useful to examine some of the consequences of Hannah Arendt ' s distinction between the social and the political.
For Arendt, social concerns were synonymous with the classical Greek idea of economics. 27 In ancient Greece, economics referred to the management of material necessity that occurred within the space of the private household. Economics represented a condition of constraint, of base biological processes common to all organic life, and was diametrically opposed to the experience of freedom. The modern idea of the social has affi nities with the economic because it implies the reduction of human experience to the form of homogeneous necessity, as in the scientifi c view of the (singular) human exemplifi ed in universalist models such as Mazlo ' s hierarchy of needs. Politics however referred to the idea of a coexistence between ontologically different (human) beings that was given defi nition through the action of individuals in a public space (polis). For Arendt the risky practice of negotiating commonality in difference between free individuals was the condition of an active worldly existence, that is, a world that felt as through it could be re-birthed as something radically different from what it was at the time. However this form of action was only possible if there was a space within which action could be experienced. The space required for defi ning a world in common was only possible through the designation of a space between free plural beings, an idea that was diffi cult to imagine if the meaning of existence and politics was reduced to an issue of life ' s necessities. A politics that was practiced to ensure freedom rather than life, and that was practiced on condition of a willingness to sacrifi ce life for freedom, represented a mode of human existence that was radically opposed to economics. Arendt ' s concern with the modern world was that the social experience had eclipsed the political experience; that economics, the language of necessity, had become the sole measure of human experience. For Arendt, this was the image of the desert-world, a politically barren world populated by riskless escapism and pseudo-activity. 28 Even with this brief description we can observe a resemblance between Arendt ' s conception of politics, Foucault ' s description of the dispersed nature of liberal control, and the elision of power within the EMUDE that calls into question the ability of social innovation to disrupt the continuity of our current situation. Despite the value of the EMUDE approach to understanding sociality and design, the tacit politics of the project appears to be (neo)liberal, both in the character of the economic rationale and the associated reduction of politics to state (economic) management. With its emphasis on diffuse enterprise, active welfare, and interest in the livelihood of stakeholders, the language of the EMUDE fi ndings are remarkably close to much of what Foucault describes as the liberal form of social discipline. This affi nity is problematic considering that it is a characteristic of liberalism to tolerate change only in so far as it does not threaten forms of social organisation that protect its fundamental economic interests. 29 The identifi cation of diffused social innovation supports the notion that self-initiated change is possible for people who can (or must) make their own opportunities, but it does not suggest an explicit challenge to a governmentality driven by a productivist agenda. Therefore, because it is concerned with changing the provisions of daily life within (rather than beyond) the strictures of (a)political practices, even an approach as progressive as EMUDE still remains allied to the structural conditions that maintain hegemonic unsustainability.
As an example of design for social innovation, the amenability of EMUDE towards resolving problems within (not against) liberalism, and the reluctance to imagine alternative practices of organising (for) political power is a telling limitation vis à vis the need for discontinuous change. Some of the limitations that stem from not recognising power and politics as agencies within social relations include an inability to differentiate between who/what (as assemblages of individuals and artefacts) can act towards sustainable futures and who/what maintains the status quo, and an inability to work explicitly towards mobilising assemblages of sustainment against established orders. If this is indeed the case, then it is reasonable to suggest that design for social innovation lacks the kind of political gravitas required to initiate a serious disruption to structural unsustainability.
By drawing a relation between Foucault, Arendt, and the early conclusions that concern the relation of design to sociality, we can observe that design is important for understanding both sociality and politics. Because it gives form to power, conditions of control, and contested ways of living, the character of design practice is inherently political. 30 Ignoring the politics of design(ing) draws the risk of being orientated by default towards the maintenance of existing structural conditions. The suggestion we fi nd in Arendt ' s philosophy is that because humans only ever have sense of worldhood through their association with things and other people it should be expected that design has a role to play in developing political ontologies, including the kind of radical ontology that is able to recognise and mobilise against the unsustainable.
An inference that follows from both this point and the critique of EMUDE offered above is that designers, researchers, theorists, and educators working within or in association with the fi eld of social innovation must view their practice in terms of its political agency. To offer a sense of what this might mean I would draw a distinction between pragmatic social intervention and a praxiological politics. While the former may allow people to cope more easily with their everyday challenges, the socio-technical assemblages it forms would be politically hetrogeneous and open to manipulation. For instance, within a liberal political order a pragmatic social innovation may be useful for relieving the burden of state expenditure without threatening established power relations or economic interests. A praxiological politics on the other hand, would be concerned with consciously generating politically autonomous socio-technical assemblages that are antithetical to the unsustainable. These assemblages would need to be elastic enough to cope with change and crisis but resistant to political co-option. Designers in this sense, professional or not, may seek to engage at various levels with the political implications of space, visibility, time, labour, consumption, production, fi nance, exchange, and ownership. Designers might also take on the role of mediating between groups taking action, government institutions, and other signifi cant actors. 31 Furthermore, designers could use their expertise to visualise, advocate and promote alternative social policies, development agendas, and importantly, new ways of practising politics.
Conclusion
The objective of the paper was to register the need to examine the relation of design to sociality both as a question in itself and in relation to the politics of sustainability. The mainstreaming of social innovation discourse makes this a topical subject but beyond the immediacy of these developments there is an obvious need for the rigorous examination of the social signifi cance of design. This agenda must be driven by the need to understand the kind of designing required in order to achieve social relations that are more sustainable and more equitable. As a contribution to this agenda I have argued that power and politics are signifi cant blind spots in the theory of design for social innovation. Furthermore, I suggest that this oversight has the potential to limit the ability of actors to instigate discontinuous change in the interest of sustainability.
Regarding social innovation itself, the idea of innovation not simply being a technical phenomenon is important to engage with as it signals that the sociality of things and people should be a matter of interest for designers and design researchers. As such I have also suggested that design should be considered within any approach to social innovation because designed artefacts are a necessary element of sociality. However, regarding the need for discontinuous change, a signifi cant limitation in current approaches to design for social innovation is its political amenability. Rather than being a sign of success, the fact that social innovation has been so widely adopted as a legitimate development practice may indeed be a sign of its usefulness to established political orders. For those who recognise the need for discontinuous change this amenability suggests that social innovation is politically inert and therefore lacks the ability to galvanise action against structural unsustainability. Social innovation is evidently a useful way to produce valuable ' social ' outcomes, but so long as it persists in trying to achieve its objectives via apolitical means its potential to instigate radical change will continue to be compromised.
Notes
Social innovation is understood as the development of 1.
novel social arrangements that meet everyday needs. 
